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The subject of the conflicts of nationality laws has already been
discussed at some length by the writer in articles published in the
YALE LAW JOURNAL.1 Since those articles were published, this
whole subject has received the attention of several organizations
devoted to the study of international law problems and of the
League of Nations, and the possibility of having these conflicts
settled through international agreements of some kind seems less
remote than it did a few years ago. In a meeting at Lima, Peru,
in December 1924, the American Institute of International Law
adopted a proposed Pan-American Convention on the subject of
nationality. This project was discussed at the meetings of the
American Society of International Law at Washington in April,
19252 and 1926. The general question was also discussed rather
fully at the meeting of the International Law Association at
Stockholm, September 8 to 13, 1924, and resolutions were adopted
recommending the adoption of an international code, in the form
of a model statute and multilateral convention.2 Last year the
subject was taken up by the committee of the League of Nations
on codification of international law, and the sub-committee on
nationality laws reported in January last. This report has just
been made public.4
In this article the writer will consider the subject with refer-
ence to the measures now being attempted for having conflicts
of nationality laws settled by international agreements. Before
attempting to make suggestions concerning a model statute to
be recommended for adoption by all countries, or a multilateral
treaty for the termination of conflicts of nationality laws, or
both, it seems necessary to consider certain underlying principles
or concepts, and in order to do this it is necessary to direct at-
tention first to the conditions which give rise to the conflicts.
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If we had to do solely with the status of true emigrants, that
is, persons who migrate from one country and settle permanently
in another, taking with them their wives and children if they
are married, the problem would not be so great. The original
settlers of our country were mostly of the class just mentioned.
They emigrated with the intention of making a new home in the
new land and of remaining there. Political and religious, as
well as economic, reasons caused them to seek a new country for
their habitation. In recent years the great migrations to the
United States, especially from countries of southern and eastern
Europe have been due almost entirely to economic causes. The
lure of high wages, rather than a desire to find conditions more
congenial from the political or religious viewpoint, was the prin-
cipal cause of the vast influx of aliens into the United States in
the period following the Civil War. In other words, great
masses of aliens came to the United States for what they could
get out of it, and, after, they had accumulated enough money,
went back to the countries from which they had come to spend
the remainder of their lives there. Among these, many, for one
reason or another, had obtained naturalization as citizens of the
United States. Some, especially Italians, Greeks and Syrians,
had left wives in their native lands when they went to the United
States; others, especially Czechs and Hungarians, had brought
their wives with them and children had been born to them in the
United States. These children in many cases were taken by their
mothers to the old country and there continued to reside, thinking
or caring little or nothing about the country of their birth until
they were in danger of being called for military service in the
country of their residence or themselves felt the lure of high
wages in the United States. It is this shifting population which
has given rise to the bulk of the cases involving conflicts of laws.
In the present article it will not be attempted to discuss all of
the subjects relating to nationality which may be comprehended
in an international code. The particular problems to which at-
tention will be directed in this discussion are (1) the problem
of naturalization, including the question of the right of expatria-
tion and the status of naturalized citizens who return to their
native lands to reside; (2) the problem of dual nationality; (3)
the problem of no nationality or statelessness; and (4) the prob-
lem of the status of women married to men having nationalities
different from theirs.
Let us now consider briefly certain principles which, it is be-
lieved should be recognized as underlying the law of nationality.
These principles may be expressed as follows:
1. Nationality involves reciprocal obligations on the part of the
state and of the individual.
2. The right of expatriation, as a natural human right, is recog-
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nized. Any limitations thereon must be based upon present, not
future, obligations to the state.
3. Nationality should be single and undivided.
4. It is desirable that, so far as possible, members of the same
family be of the same nationality.
5. It is desirable that so far as possible, nationality and domi-
cile coincide.
The modern democratic state may be regarded as a people
organized for the mutual benefit of its members, and each member
may be regarded as voluntarily adhering to the organization. It
is true that the great majority of the members of any state have
acquired their membership by birth within its territory or by
descent, but those who, having reached the age of majority, have
remained in the state, may be regarded as having voluntarily
adhered to it, and, in doing so, as having voluntarily assumed the
obligations of citizenship. Among these obligations are the duty
to support the government through payment of taxes, the duty
to take part in carrying on government through voting or holding
office, the duty to aid the administration of justice by serving on
juries when summoned, the duty to aid in the defense of the state
when needed, and, in general, the duty to play one's part in the
common life, and contribute in some way to the national welfare.
In return for the performance of these duties the citizen relies
upon the state to grant him protection of person and property at
home and abroad and to perform functions of a public character
for the advancement of his interests and the interests of the other
members of the state. However much the theory of the social
contract may be criticised, it remains true that the tie bet:een
the member of a modern democratic state and the state itself is
in the nature of a contract. Moral allegiance, or loyalty, should,
no doubt, in a right-minded person accompany legal allegiance,
but it is distinct from it. It is a state of mind, a sense of human
obligation or brotherhood, which exists in any association of men
banded together for mutual benefit, whether for business, social
or religious purposes, and is naturally strongest in the greatest
of all associations, the state. In its highest manifestations it is
a most noble and generous trait, having a sort of mystic quality;
in its lowest it is nothing more than the herd instinct. While loy-
alty should accompany nationality, it should not be regarded as
preventing the individual from separating himself from the state
if and when he finds it to his advantage to do so, and transferring
his allegiance to another state, for surely the state is made for man
and not man for the state. This brings us to the second principle
mentioned above.
The history of the "right of expatriation" as advocated by our
own country was traced by the present writer in his article in
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this journal on Naturalization and Expatriation2' It is hard to
conceive of a country such as ours, whose population is made up
so largely of expatriates from other countries, failing to recognize
the right of expatriation at least as a moral right, if not as a recog-
nized rule of international law. As we shall see, the International
Law Association, in its meeting at Stockholm in 1924,0 seems to
have recognized the right of expatriation as now at least worthy of
general acceptance, notwithstanding the refusal of some European
countries to give it recognition. It must be admitted, however,
that the right of expatriation can not be regarded as absolute and
unlimited. It must be regarded as subject to reasonable limita-
tions arising out of the obligation of an individual to aid in the
defense of the country to which he belongs. This is a difficult
point, which will be considered further on.
The third principle mentioned above, that of singleness of alle-
giance, is generally recognized as a desideratum, although differ-
ences of opinion may exist as to how it is to be made effective in
all cases. Recognition of allegiance as an artificial, legal tie, sub-
ject, with certain limitations, to severance at the will of the indi-
vidual does not mean that its obligations, so long as the tie exists,
are to be lightly regarded. On the contrary the obligations of a
tie which is voluntarily maintained are more binding morally than
the obligations of a tie which is maintained by the force of the
state, and it is difficult to see how any person can voluntarily
maintain a true allegiance to more than one state. Obviously,
when an individual is a national of two states which are at war
with each other, he cannot maintain a true allegiance to both, and
even in time of peace it is impossible for an individual at one time
to serve two states whole-heartedly as a citizen should. His alle-
giance to one or the other will be merely nominal, or else his alle-
giance to both will be weak and uncertain. Reference is made
particularly to dual allegiance existing in the case of a person
born in one country of parents having the nationality of another.
As explained in the writer's article in this Journal on Dual Alle-
giance and Election,7 it frequently happens that such a person is
born a national of one state under jus soli and a national of
another under jus sanguinis. Under our own law, dual nation-
ality is not recognized as existing in the case of one who has fore-
sworn his former allegiance and assumed American allegiance
through naturalization. Whether it will be possible to arrive at
satisfactory international agreements for preventing or termi-
nating dual nationality will be considered later.
The fourth principle mentioned above, that so far as possible
members of a family should be of the same nationality, hardly
Supra, note 1.
O International Law Association Reports, Third-third Conference (1924).
7Supra note 1.
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needs argument. This refers, of course, to parents and minor
children and to husbands and wives. As to parents and children,
there is, however, no reason why the latter should after reaching
majority, cleave to the nationality of their parents. The principal
difficulty arises from the married women's citizenship act of
1922, known as the Cable Act,8 and the laws of some foreign coun-
tries under which husbands and wives may have different nation-
alities.
The last of the principles mentioned, that it is, as a rule, desir-
able that nationality and domicile coincide, follows logically from
the first and third principles. When a person having the nation-
ality of one country establishes himself permanently in another,
unless he in some way represents establishments or interests in
the country of his nationality, he will not, as a rule, contribute to
the welfare of that country as a citizen should. On the contrary
he is apt to transfer his sympathies to the country in which he
has established his permanent home or else to lose all sense of
national attachment. This is especially true in the case of a
naturalized citizen who returns to his country of origin to reside.
This does not mean that it is believed that a penalty of any kind
should be placed on foreign residence, per se, even though it is
prolonged. Even permanent residence in a foreign country may
be consonant with the retention of nationality when there are
special reasons for such foreign residence, other than a mere pref-
erence for living in the foreign country. Thus prolonged, and
even permanent, foreign residence may be justified by reason of
health or the pursuit of art or special studies for which facilities
cannot be found in the country of nationality. From the stand-
point of the country of domicile, it is undesirable and even perilous
to have permanently established within its territory large num-
bers of persons who do not owe to that country permanent alle-
giance. Political detachment and irresponsibility are apt to be
accompanied by disregard for law and order.
THE PROBLEM OF NATURALIZATION
The problem of naturalization in its international phase involves
questions of the right of expatriation, the liability of naturalized
citizens for offenses committed against their countries of origin
and the status of naturalized citizens who return to their coun-
tries of origin for prolonged or permanent residence.
The question of the right of expatriation was considered by
the American Institute of International Law, and Article 3 of the
draft convention approved by that body in its meeting in Decem-
ber, 1924, provided as follows:
"Naturalization can be granted in an American Republic only
SAct of Sept. 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021).
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when the foreigner proves that by such naturalization he loses
nationality in his native country."
It is quite remarkable that a body composed of representatives
of the American Republics should have given its approval to the
provision just quoted, which is directly opposed to the position
taken by the Government of the United States many years ago
and formally declared by the Congress of the United States in
the famous Joint Resolution of July 27, 1868, in which it was
asserted that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent
right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and that "all naturalized
citizens of the United States, while in foreign countries, are en-
titled to and shall receive from this Government the same pro-
tection of persons and property which is accorded to native-born
citizens." 11
The provision quoted from the proposed Pan-American Conven-
tion is clearly reactionary, and it is not believed that the Govern-
ment of the United States would ever give its assent to it. The
same may be said of the provision of the Preliminary Draft of a
Convention annexed to the report of the Sub-Committee of the
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Cod-
ification of International Law. It is found in Article 6, which
reads as follows :10
"Naturalisation may not be conferred upon a foreigner with-
out his having shown the will to be naturalised or at least without
his being allowed to refuse naturalisation.
"Naturalisation acquired without the applicant being re-
leased from his allegiance by the State of origin does not give to
the State according such naturalisation the right to give diplo-
matic protection to, and to intervene on behalf of, the person
naturalised as against the State whose subject he originally was."
It is still more remarkable that-the International Law Associa-
tion, a body composed principally of representatives of European
countries, should have declared in favor of the right of expatria-
tion. The Association adopted a resolution approving the declar-
ations contained in the Joint Resolution of Congress of July 27,
1868, and providing that,11
"the acquisition of a new nationality should ipso facto cancel any
former nationality theretofore existing."
As to the liability of a naturalized citizen for an offense com-
mitted against his country of origin before his emigration there
can hardly be any question, for the United States has recognized
such liability in a number of naturalization treaties. 12 In some
9 U. S. Rev. Sts., 1868, sec. 1999-2000.
lo Supra note 4, at 20.
ll Supra note 3, at 32.
1 See for example Article 2 of the Naturalization Treaty of 1868 between
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of the naturalization treaties to which this country is a party it is
specifically provided, however, that a naturalized citizen shall not
be held liable to punishment for the act of emigration itself.13
Whether the provision last mentioned would be generally agreed
to may be doubtful. Countries which lay stress upon the import-
ance of keeping a hold upon their male nationals of the military
service age might object to a provision such as that contained in
the treaty with Sweden and Norway, and would probably insist
upon a qualification to the effect that a person whose emigration
involves desertion or failure to obey an express summons to ap-
pear for military service should be held liable to punishment upon
his return.14 This problem of military service has so far pre-
vented the conclusion of naturalization treaties between the
United States and some of the principal countries of Europe.
But for this impediment no doubt all countries would agree to the
right of expatriation. It will be hard to overcome it until the
principal powers of Europe have agreed to abolish large standing
armies in times of peace. Even our own country has qualified
the declaration contained in the Joint Resolution of 1868 by the
provision of Section 2 of the Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907,15
"that no American citizen shall be allowed to ex\patriate himself
while this country is at war." This provision has accomplished
no good whatsoever, and, as it has been construed, it has had a
very absurd result. American nationals who took foreign oaths
of allegiance while the United States was neutral in the World
War, even in connection with entry into the armies of countries
with which the United States later became associated in the War,
are held to have lost their American nationality, while those who
took foreign oaths of allegiance after the United States had en-
tered the War, even in connection with entry into the enemy
armies, did not thereby lose their American nationality. The pro-
vision in question should be repealed and replaced by a provision
penalizing an act of expatriation committed by an American
the United States and Belgium, 1 Malloy, Trcatics Conventions, etc., betwcc
the United States and Other Powers (1910) 80.
is See, for example, Article 2 of the Naturalization Treaty of 1369 be-
tween the United States and Sweden and Norway, 2 Malloy, op. cit. 1759.
14 The naturalization convention of 1870 between the United States and
Austria-Hungary provided in Article II that a naturalized American citizen
of Austrian or Hungarian origin should be liable to punishment in Austria-
Hungary under any of the following conditions:
"1st. If he has emigrated, after having been drafted at the time of con-
scription, and thus having become enrolled as a recruit for service in the
standing army.
"2d. If he has emigrated whilst he stood in service under the flag, or
had a leave of absence only for a limited time.
"3d. If, having a leave of absence for an unlimited time, or belonging
to the reserve or to the militia, he has emigrated after having received a
call into service, or after a public proclamation requiring his appearace,
or after war has broken out." 1 Malloy, op. cit, 45.
1 34 Stat. at L. 1228.
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national while this country is at war. It would seem suf-
ficient to provide that such a person should thereafter be ineligi-
ble to naturalization in this country. Incidentally it may be
added that the law should also be amended to make it clear that
no American national can expatriate himself by taking a foreign
oath of allegiance or obtaining foreign nationality while he is
within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States. The
country need not be greatly concerned over the cases of nationals
who commit acts of expatriation in foreign countries while this
country is at war. Retention of such persons as nationals is not
desirable, and the present statutory presumption will never serve
to prevent acts of disloyalty.
As to the status of naturalized citizens who resume their resi-
dence in their native lands, it may be observed that such cases
were made the subject of a special Pan-American Convention,
signed at Rio de Janeiro August 13, 1906, to which the United
States is a party, and in which it is provided that a person of the
class mentioned should "be considered as having reassumed his
original citizenship, and as having renounced the citizenship
acquired by the said naturalization." 16 There would seem to be
no reason why a provision such as this should not be generally
accepted. Controversies might arise in particular cases as to
whether individuals have in fact established a residence of a per-
manent character in their native lands, but it is difficult to devise
any international agreements concerning the administration of
which controversies might not arise. It may be added that the
provision in question is based upon the same principle which un-
derlies the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906,17 and the second paragraph
of Section 2 of the Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907,18 both of
which were discussed in the writer's article on Naturalization
and Expatriation.0
It might be possible to obtain general international agreement
to a provision reading somewhat as follows:
A national of a state has a right to expatriate himself, provided
that, at the time of his emigration, he has not been summoned for
active military or other service to the state. An expatriate, how-
ever, shall remain liable to punishment for any offense committed
against his former state before emigration or for emigration after
a summons of the kind mentioned has been made upon him and
has not been obeyed.
If a person who has acquired the nationality of a state through
naturalization returns to the state of his former allegiance for
permanent residence, he shall be deemed to have renounced his
naturalization and to have resumed his former nationality.
16 3 Malloy, op. cit. 2882.
1 34 Stat at L. 596, 601.
18Supra note 15.
29Supra note 1.
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THE PROBLEMT OF DUAL NATIONALITY
Dual nationality arises in multitudes of cases of persons born
in one country of parents who are nationals of another. Dis-
cussions of this problem always involve the question whether the
various countries of the world may be induced to adopt a uniform
rule for native citizenship, or, if not, whether a general agree-
ment upon a rule for terminating the condition of dual nationality
after the persons concerned reach the age of majority, or even
before, may be adopted.
The present writer suggested in his article on Dua! Nationz!ity
and Election,,- that dual nationality might be prevented by a gen-
eral agreement to a rule that nationality should be dependent upon
the parental domicile at the time of the child's birth. It vas
pointed out, however, that this would involve an amendraent of
the provision of Article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States and amendments of provisions iound
in the Constitutions of certain Latin American countries. An-
other practical objection to this proposed rule is the difficulty
which would be encountered in many cases in proving the place
of the parental domicile at the time when an individual was born.
The American Institute of International Law attempted to solve
this problem by Article 1 of the proposed Pan-American Conven-
tion which reads as follows:
"Individuals born on the territory of an American Republic are
nationals of the said republic, whatever may be the nationality
of their parents; such individuals, on reaching majority may
make a declaration expressing a desire to the contrary and adopt
the nationality of the country of their father or mother."
The International Law Association attempted to solve this
same problem by the following provision contained in its proposed
"Model Statute :" 21
"(a) Every child born within the territory of a conforming
State shall become a national of that State. Provided always that
in any case in which the father . . . of such child, being a
national of another State, shall within a specified prescribed
period register such child as a national of the State to which he
belongs, such child shall cease to be a national of such conforming
State and shall become a national of the State to which its father
belongs.
(b) Every child born within a conforming State which has,
pursuant to the proviso contained in sub-section (a), become the
national of its father's . . . State, who shall within a year
after attaining the age of twenty-one years claim to be re-admitted
as a national of such conforming State, shall be so re-admitted
without having to comply with any other conditions."
It is believed that neither of the proposed provisions just quoted
20o Supra note 1.
2 Supra note 3, at 29.
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would conflict with the provision of Article 14 of the Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. The declaration therein
that "all persons born . . . in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside" does not, it is believed, prevent
the enactment of a law or the conclusion of a treaty providing
for the termination of the American nationality of persons born
in this country. It is believed that the Constitutional provision
quoted was intended merely to make it clear that all persons
born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, without
regard to race, are born citizens of this country. In other words,
it is a rule for determining acquisition of citizenship and not a
rule for determining loss of citizenship.
The objection to the provisions recommended by the American
Institute of International Law and the International Law Associa-
tion is that both of them make it possible for persons born in a
country to divest themselves of the nationality thereof while re-
maining resident therein. From the point of view of the United
States and other countries having a large alien population, such a
provision could hardly be found acceptable. There would seem
to be no objection to the provisions of the Institute and the Asso-
ciation, however, if they should be modified by the addition of
clauses to the effect that the election of the nationality of the
parents in the case of a native citizen could be made only after
such native citizen had ceased to reside in the country of birth.
The International Law Association recommended an interna-
tional convention to apply to cases where dual nationality exists.
It reads as follows :22
"(1) Where any person is a national of two contracting Powers
by reason of a conflict between their respective laws such person
shall, while resident within the territory of either Power, be
treated as exclusively under allegiance to the Power within whose
territory such person is resident, and shall, while such residence
continues, cease to be subject to any duties or liabilities affecting
the nationals of the other Power as such nationals.
"(2) Where any person is a national of two contracting Powers
as aforesaid, such person shall, while residing within the territory
of any third Power, be treated as exclusively under the allegiance
of the contracting Power whose protection has been claimed by
application for a passport, certificate of origin, or other document
identifying the national status of such person."
The first paragraph of the proposed convention just quoted
is unobjectionable. To all intents and purposes it is a declaration
of a generally recognized rule of law. 3
Th second paragraph of the proposed convention would prob-
ably, for all practical purposes, be satisfactory in operation. It
may be observed, however, that the problem of dual nationality
2 Supra note 3, at 31.
23 Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, supra note 1, at 703-704.
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does not often raise difficulties except where the person concerned
is within the jurisdiction of one or the other of the countries
claiming his allegiance.
The League of Nations Sub-committee seems to have despaired
of devising any workable and generally acceptable rule for either
preventing or terminating the condition of double nationality.
The opinion is expressed that- "it is doubtful whether uniform
rules for the solution of conflicts could be established without
encountering political obstacles making the introduction of inter-
national instead of national rules impossible." The report con-
cludes -5 "that any proposal put forward with the object of avoid-
ing conflicts of law must end in the drawing up of a uniform law
on nationality. The tendencies governing international practice
at the present time, however, would make such a solution impossi-
ble." In the "Preliminary Draft of a Convention" annexed to
the report the only provisions touching dual nationality are found
in Articles I and 5 which read as follows :21
"Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to
afford diplomatic protection to and not to intervene on behalf of
their nationals if the latter are simultaneously considered as its
nationals from the moment of their birth by the law of the State
on which the claim would be made."
"Article 5. A person possessing two nationalities may be re-
garded as its national by each of the States whose nationality he
has. In relation to third States, his nationality is to be deter-
mined by the law in force at his place of domicile if he is domi-
ciled in one of his two countries.
"If he is not domiciled in either of his two countries, his nation-
ality is determined in accordance with the law in force in that one
of these two States in which he was last domiciled."
It is obvious that these proposed provisions would furnish no
solution of the problem. It can not be solved without radical
amendments of the nationality laws of the various countries con-
cerned.
If it should be found impossible to adopt a rule to prevent dual
nationality from arising, it is believed by the writer that it might
still be possible to agree upon a rule for terminating this unfortu-
nate condition. The writer can think of no better solution than
that which was suggested in his previous article on this subject
published in the YALE LAW JOURNAL to the effect that the domi-
cile of the person concerned at the time of reaching the age when
he is capable of making an election should determine his nation-
ality thereafter. It might be desirable to allow such person a
period of one year after reaching the age of majority to settle the
question. The following rule is therefore suggested, for inclu-
sion in a model statute or an international convention:
2- Supra note 4, at 6.
25 Supra note 4, at 6.
26 Supra note 4, at 20.
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"A person who is born a national of one country under jus sol!
and a national of another country under jus sanguinis, if he is
domiciled in either of the two countries when he reaches the age
of 22 years shall thereafter be regarded as having lost the nation-
ality of the other. If, at the time when he reaches the age of 22
years, he is domiciled in a third country, he shall thereafter be
regarded as having the nationality of that one of the two coun-
tries claiming his nationality in which he was last domiciled."
The advantages of this proposed rule are first, its simplicity,
second, the fact that the nationality of the person concerned is
determined by his own acts and not by mere declarations, and
third, that it observes the rule that nationality and domicile should,
whenever possible, coincide.
It will doubtless be objected that the proposed rule would work
a hardship in some cases, but it should be realized that no effec-
tive rule for terminating dual nationality can be devised which
will not cause inconvenience to some of the individuals affected.
It should be borne in mind that the effect of the proposed rule is
not to deprive the individual of nationality altogether, but merely
to determine which of two nationalities he is to retain. Further-
more, if such a person has an earnest desire to be a national of
the country in which he is not domiciled upon attaining the age
mentioned, it may still be possible for him to take up his residence
in such country and acquire naturalization therein.
It might furtfier be objected that the proposed rule would vio-
late the provision of Article V of the Constitution of the United
States that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." This same objection was advanced
in the case of Mackenzie v. Hare,27 against Section 3 of the Ex-
patriation Act of March 2, 1907, in which it was provided that"
"any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the
nationality of her husband," that is, shall lose her American na-
tionality. But the Supreme Court held that the argument was
invalid, since any American woman who married an alien after
the passage of the statute in question must be deemed to have
done so "With notice of the consequences" of her action, under the
statute. The same would be true of a person born in the United
States of alien parents who should retain a domicile in the country
of his parents' nationality until reaching the age mentioned. It
would be only reasonable in such a case to impute to the person in
question a deliberate choice of the nationality of his parents and
renunciation of the American nationality acquired by the accident
of birth in this country. It may be added that little, if any, real
hardship would be involved in the application of the proposed rule.
In nearly all cases it would be found that the persons affected had
been domiciled in their parents' country since early childhood.
27 (1915) 239 U. S. 299, 36 Sup. Ct. 106.
28 Supra note 15.
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THE PROBLEM OF NO NATIONALITY
This would not be mentioned as one of the major problems con-
cerning nationality were it not for two facts; first, that writers
.on international law and the law of nationality usually assume
that the existence of persons having no nationality is more or less
of a calamity, for which a remedy should be sought, and second,
that cases of no nationality have been increased by the passage
of the Cable Act2 concerning the nationality of married women. 9
The cases last referred to are those of foreign women who have
married American citizens since September 22, 1922 and, under
the laws of their countries, have lost the nationality thereof, but,
under the provision of Section 2 of the Cable Act, have not ac-
quired American nationality. The condition of no nationality
also exists in the cases of Americans who have lost their Ameri-
can nationality, under the provision of Section 2 of the Act of
1arch 2, 1907,31 by taking foreign oaths of allegiance. Again,
this condition may exist in cases of naturalized citizens who, hav-
ing resided for two years in their native lands or five years in
other foreign countries, have brought upon themselves the pre-
sumption of expatriation under the same statute. Unless and
until such presumption has been overcome, such persons are in
the position of having no nationality. If it is really a matter of
great importance to prevent the condition of no nationality from
arising or to make it easy for the individual concerned or his par-
ents to terminate it, special rules to cover these cases could no
doubt be devised without much difficulty. Thus, it might very
well be agreed that the administration of an oath of allegiance to
an alien shall always be regarded as equivalent to naturalization.
Cases of naturalized citizens who have resumed residence of a
permanent character in their native lands would be covered by a
provision similar to that contained in the Pan-American Conven-
tion of 1906, mentioned above. Perhaps a general rule for the
naturalization of a person having no nationality after a compara-
tively brief period of residence might be agreed to. With regard
to this question it may be observed that the resolution of the Inter-
national Law Association mentioned above contains a provision
that 32
"nationality should only be lost after the effect of the acquisi-
tion of another nationality."
The provision just quoted is not deemed desirable. It would
nullify the provision of Section 2 of the Expatriation Act of March
2, 1907, concerning the presumption of expatriation arising
.-Spra note S.
co See Flournoy, New Marricd Worocz's CWt:eaship Lazw, , note 1.
-"Supra note 15.
Supra note 3, at 32.
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against naturalized citizens because of protracted residence
abroad, and would make it impossible for any country to provide
by domestic legislation for the expatriation of its nationals ex-
cept in cases where they acquire another nationality.
While there seems to be no reason for making special provisions
to prevent persons from divesting themselves of nationality by
their own deliberate acts, it may be desirable to attempt to adopt
measures to clothe all persons with the nationality of some country
at birth. For this purpose the following provisions of Articles
3 and 4 of the League of Nations draft convention would seem
adequate :3
"A child born of parents who are unknown or whose nationality
cannot be ascertained acquires the nationality of the State in
which it was born or found when it cannot claim another nation-
ality in right of birth, proof of such other nationality being ad-
missible under the law in force at the place where it was found or
born."
"Article 4. A child born outside the State of which its parents
are nationals has the nationality of the State where it was born
if the State of origin does not give the parent's nationality to such
child."
It may be observed, however, that Article 4 would not be accept-
able to countries, such as our own, whose laws of native citizen-
ship are based primarily on jus soli, if it means that a child is
not to be regarded as a citizen of the country of birth in any case
where it is claimed as a national of another country of which its
parents are nationals.
THE PROBLEM OF THE NATIONALITY OF WOMEN WHO MARRY MEN
HAVING A NATIONALITY DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS
It need hardly be said that this problem has arisen in most
cases from the passage of the Cable Act and the subsequent agi-
tation carried on in other countries for the passage of similar leg-
islation, under which a woman does not acquire the nationality
of her husband by the fact of her marriage to him and is not
naturalized as a citizen of another country through his naturaliz-
ation therein. The International Law Association included in
its "Model Statute" a section reading as follows :34
"(a) A woman national of a conforming State shall not by
reason of her marriage with a national of a non-conforming State
lose her original nationality, unless or until by reason of such
marriage she becomes a national of such other State, either auto-
matically or by naturalization.
"(b) A woman national of a conforming State marrying a
national of another conforming State shall acquire her husband's
nationality, unless she does, under the law of the State to which
she belonged before marriage, retain the nationality of such State,
33 Supra note 4, at 20.
84 Supra note 3, at 30.
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or unless she makes a formal declaration (to be recorded on the
register of marriages) to the effect that she wishes to retain her
former nationality."
To meet the troublesome cases arising out of provisions of na-
tionality laws such as the Cable Act the League of Nations Sub-
committee makes the following proposals, contained in Articles
9 and 10 of the draft convention :3
"Article 9. A married woman loses her original nationality in
virtue of marriage only if at the moment of marriage she is re-
garded by the law of the State to which her husband belongs as
having acquired the latter's nationality.
"Where a change in the husband's nationality occurs during the
marriage the wife loses her husband's nationality only if the law
of the State whose subject her husband has become regards her
as having acquired the latter's nationality."
"Article 10. A woman who does not acquire through marriage
the nationality of her husband and who, at the same time, is re-
garded by the law of her country of origin as having lost her
nationality through marriage, shall nevertheless be entitled to a
passport from the State of which her husband is a national on
the same footing as her husband."
It is believed, notwithstanding the arguments put forth by
those who favor the rules contained in the Cable Act, that the
maintenance, so far as possible, of the unity of the family as to
nationality is most desirable. Moreover, it is believed that most
women are content to take the nationality of their husbands,
unless, perhaps, they continue to reside after marriage in their
own countries. If it is possible to obtain an amendment of the
Cable Law, it is believed that a rule providing somewhat as fol-
lows might be generally agreed to:
"A woman who marries a man having a nationality different
from hers or whose husband acquires a nationality different from
hers through naturalization shall take the nationality of her hus-
band unless, within a period of one month before or after the
marriage or the naturalization of the husband, she makes a formal
declaration of a desire to retain her own nationality. However,
if such a woman acquires a domicile in the country of which her
husband is a national, she shall ipso facto acquire his nationality."
It is believed that a rule such as that just quoted would
contain a sufficient concession to women who desire to assert their
own rights as to nationality.
It is interesting to observe that Miss Chrystal Macl~lillan in
the discussion at Stockholm, contended that the mother of a
child as well as the father should have a right to decide the nation-
ality of the child in a case of dual nationality. She did not e:.plain
which choice would prevail in case they differed, but her opinion
upon this point may be surmised. In the same discussion Dr. G.
.M. Palliccia made the following observations.2
-' Supra note 4, at 20.
sc Supra note 3, at 43.
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"According to my opinion you have to choose either the nation-
ality of the husband or the nationality of the wife. I do not say
that the husband is a higher or more perfect animal than the wife.
I think perhaps very often ladies are more perfect than gentle-
men; but as one must be the head of the company or of the State,
so we must have a head in a family. Either it must be the hus-
band or it must be the wife. .
"Let us have one nationality, and, if you like, let us choose the
nationality of the wife, instead of that of the man. There will
be perhaps a certain return to the period of matriarchy, but, after
all, the world was not so bad under matriarchy."
CONCLUSION
The report of the Sub-committee of the League of Nations does
not give much encouragement to those who have hoped that con-
flicts of nationality laws might be removed by international agree-
ments. The committee approached the subject in a very cautious
and conservative spirit, with evident reluctance to the making
of proposals which might seem to be chimerical or to question in
any degree the moral and legal right of States to have nationality
laws adjusted in every particular to their own political needs as
they see them. The r'cpporteur, M. Rundstein, made the follow-
ing rather pessimistic observations:
"It is obvious that, when a problem has a political as well as a
legal aspect and the former must prevail over the latter, no action
can be taken. It is therefore impossible to effect a uniform regu-
lation of all problems arising out of conflicts of nationality; the
work can only be achieved by a process of selection and elimina-
tion. No solution can be hdped for where there is the slightest
suspicion that the problem is of a political nature." "-
"Two very eminent jurists, Weiss (Treatise I, page 329) and
Oppenheim (International Law, I, page 487), have hoped that the
solution of the conflicts with which we are dealing might be ob-
tained by establishing a uniform law embodied in an interna-
tional convention, or by formulating an international obligation for
the States to revise their internal laws on a common basis, which
would serve as a model for the drafting of such laws. This
would represent an ideal, the maximum which any international
jurist would have the right to contemplate.
"I am of opinion, however, that, in order to reach this goal-
which would mean the solution of all conflicts-it will be neces-
sary to proceed by stages, for a universal regulation touching upon
the substance of the matter would not seem to be compatible with
the legal situation at the present day; it would surely be unfortu-
nate if, by attempting tasks which for the moment are beyond us,
we were to fail to achieve results which, although modest, would
be of great value and, last but not least, practicable." 3
While no one who has given this subject careful thought can
entertain a reasonable hope that the present conflicts can be re-
moved in the immediate future by the waving of a magic wand
37 Supra note 4, at 20.38Supra note 4, at 13.
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in the shape of an international code, the writer believes that
much may be accomplished through persistent and intelligent
effort and a spirit of reasonable conciliation, although it must be
realized that the obstacles will be hard to overcome so long as mil-
itarism continues to exist and large standing armies continue to
be maintained. The chief difficulties arise from the need, actual
or supposed, of certain countries to retain the allegiance of all men
upon whom they have any claim for their armies. However, the
success of the government of our own country in concluding the
naturalization conventions of 1363-1S71 with the German states
and Austria-Hungary, and in persuading Great Britain not only
to enter into the convention of 1870 but even to amend her nation-
ality law and abandon the antiquated principle of indissoluble alle-
giance, should encourage the belief that the existing conflicts in
nationality laws, or most of them, may yet be removed. If it is
possible to accomplish a general reduction of armaments through
international agreements, it is surely within the range of possi-
bility to remove conflicts of nationality laws in the same way. If
anything of real value is to be accomplished, however, it will be
necessary to approach the subject in a temper more aggressive
and more constructive than that exhibited by the League of Na-
tions Committee. Mere statements of the few points as to which
general agreement now exists and attempts to remove minor con-
flicts should not be accepted as sufficient. An effort should be
made to settle the major problems, particularly the question of
the right of expatriation and the question of the prevention or
termination of dual nationality arising out of conflicting claims
based upon jus soli and jus sangz'inis. The best procedure for
accomplishing the desired result would probably be the formula-
tion by experts from the interested countries of a code covering
all conflicts of importance and the conclusion of a multilateral
convention, not adopting the code, but merely agreeing to recom-
mend it, as a whole or in part, to the legislative bodies of the sig-
natory powers for their consideration and possible adoption.
